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Abstract
Boarding schools substitute school to home, but little is known on the effects this
substitution produces on students. We present results of an experiment in which seats in
a boarding school for disadvantaged students were randomly allocated. Boarders enjoy
better studying conditions than control students. However, they start outperforming
control students in mathematics only two years after admission, and this effect mostly
comes from strong students. After one year, levels of well-being are lower among boarders,
but in their second year, students adjust: well-being catches-up. This suggests that
substituting school to home is disruptive: only strong students benefit from the boarding
school, once they have managed to adapt to their new environment.
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1 Introduction
Boarding schools are an intensive form of education, in which students live at school, and visit
their families only for weekends and vacations. There is a long-standing tradition in American
and English upper-class families of sending male children to elite boarding schools even at a
very young age. Cookson et al. (2008) argue that by doing so, parents hope to provide their
children a sense of discipline, and, thus, prepare them for leadership positions. But boarding
schools have also been used to increase the educational opportunities of marginalized and
disadvantaged students. In the end of the 19th century, American philanthropists from the
Indian Rights Association set up boarding schools for American Indians’ children, most often
located outside their parents’ reservations. These philanthropists were hoping to assimilate
these children into mainstream American culture, something they thought would be impossible
to achieve through regular schooling: “Placing these wild children under a teacher’s care for
five hours a day, and permitting them to spend the other nineteen in the (...) degradation
of the village, makes the attempt to educate (...) them a mere farce” (Report of the US
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1878). In 1926, 83 percent of the American Indian school-age
population was enrolled in one of these boarding schools (see Adams, 1995). More recently,
boarding schools have received renewed interest from policymakers seeking ways to enhance
the academic progress of disadvantaged students. Two examples are the SEED boarding
schools in the United States which serve poor black students, and the “boarding schools of
excellence” in France which serve relatively high-ability students from poor families. In both
cases, policy makers opened these schools because they were concerned that the poor studying
conditions and negative influences students are exposed to in their home environment could
impair their academic potential.
The explicit goal of these boarding schools is to operate a substitution between the two
main inputs of the education production function, namely school and home environment,
under the presumption that this will generate better outcomes for students. However, very
little is known on the effects this substitution actually produces. Curto & Fryer (2014) is the
only paper we are aware of which studies this question. The authors find that being enrolled
in the SEED boarding school in Washington DC increases students test scores by 20 percent
of a standard deviation per year spent in the school.
In this paper, we analyze the effects of a French“boarding school of excellence”on students
cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes. The school we study was created in 2009, and is located
in a rural area south of Paris. It was oversubscribed, and students offered a seat were randomly
selected out of the pool of applicants. We followed the treatment and the control groups over
two years after the lottery, and gave them cognitive and non-cognitive tests in the end of each
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academic year.
The boarding school dramatically increases the quality and the quantity of schooling
inputs: boarders benefit from smaller classes, spend longer hours in study room, report much
lower levels of classroom disruption, and praise the engagement of their teachers. These
investments have positive returns: after two years, the treatment group performs substantially
better on the math test. The difference is sizeable, and corresponds to a 20 percent standard
deviation increase per year spent in the school. However, these positive effects hide two
surprising findings. First, returns only kick in after two years: one year after the lottery,
test scores are very similar in the treatment and control groups. This is in sharp contrast
with papers studying the dynamic effects of educational interventions, which have often found
stronger effects for the first year of treatment (see Krueger (1999)), or effects that are linear
in the amount of exposure (see Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011)). Second, returns are very
heterogenous: we find that the average effect of the school after two years mostly comes from
students in the higher tercile of math scores at baseline. For them, the effect is very large,
around 50 percent of a standard deviation per year spent in the school.
We take advantage of the very detailed data we collected to investigate the mechanisms
that could underlie these surprising patterns. When students arrive at the boarding school,
they need to adapt to their new environment. First, they have to cope with the separation
from friends and family. Second, they relinquish a certain amount of freedom. For instance,
they have to wear a formal school uniform similar to those of English and American private
schools, instead of their usual clothes. They also report spending four times less time watching
television than control students, a difference probably due to the strong control exerted by
the boarding school staff. Third, boarders face higher academic demands. They are immersed
into an environment with peers who are academically stronger, and teachers who are more
demanding: most students experience a sharp decline in their grades when they enter the
school. These three factors are probably responsible for the lower levels of well-being we
observe among boarders in the end of their first year. During their second year, students
seem to adjust, and the positive effects of the intervention start kicking in. Boarders’ levels of
well-being catch-up with those of control students; their motivation becomes higher, and they
also report spending more time on their homework, while there were no differences in the end
of the first year on these two dimensions. The stark difference between returns to students’
first year and second year in the boarding school might therefore arise from the following
mechanism. Adjusting to the school reduces students well-being; this might in turn impede
their learning, until they have adapted to their new environment. This could also explain why
stronger students make more progress than weaker ones. We find some indication that the
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initial negative shock on well-being and motivation is larger for weaker students, while the
recovery is faster for stronger students, although we lack statistical power to make definitive
conclusions. Though this interpretation is somewhat speculative, we review other potential
mechanisms, and we argue that they cannot fully account for all of our findings. For instance,
recent research has shown that higher within-class ordinal position has a positive effect on
academic performance (see Murphy & Weinhardt (2013)). This can explain why weaker
students do not improve in the boarding school, as they lose many ranks when they join.
However, this fails to explain why strong students do not improve during their first year.
Overall, our results suggest that boarding is a disruptive form of schooling for students.
Once they have managed to adjust to their new environment, strong students make very
substantial academic progress. On the other hand, this type of school does not seem well-
suited to weaker students: even after two years we do not observe any test scores gains among
them.
Beyond boarding schools, our results might shed new light on recent, puzzling results on
elite schools. Many elite schools around the world use entrance exams to admit students. A
number of papers have used regression discontinuity designs to measure the effects of these
schools on students at the admission cut-off. These papers have consistently failed to find
any effects on students’ test scores (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2014 and Lucas & Mbiti,
2012) or college enrollment (see Dobbie & Fryer Jr, 2013), and have even sometimes found
negative effects on dropout rates among the most vulnerable students (see de Janvry et al.,
2012). This has been interpreted as evidence that peer effects do not play a large role in the
production of education (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2014). Our analysis might substantiate
another interpretation of these findings. When they enter these elite schools, students may
benefit from the presence of strong peers, and at the same time, they may also be hampered
by the need to adapt to a new, more competitive environment - as happens to students in
our boarding school. The absence of any effect for students at the threshold could then be
the sum of a positive peer effect and a negative adaptation effect. Moreover, overcoming
this adaptation process might be easier for stronger students, so effects for them might be
larger than for students at the admission cut-off. If this is the case, regression discontinuity
estimates could differ from the average effect of these schools.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our research
design, the complex data collection we had to complete for this project, and our study pop-
ulation. In Section 3, we present the main differences between the boarding school and the
schools in which control students are enrolled. In Section 4, we present the effects the board-
ing school produces on students test scores. In Section 5, we discuss potential mechanisms
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underlying these effects. Section 6 concludes.
2 Research design, data, and study population
In the fall of 2005, important riots took place in the suburbs of Paris and other large French
cities. These events triggered a number of political responses, including which the “Inter-
nats d’excellence” program. “Internats d’excellence” could be translated as “boarding schools
targeting excellence”. These schools are dedicated to motivated and relatively high ability
students in poor suburbs of large French cities. Policy makers were concerned that in those
suburbs, poor school quality, negative influences from peers, and bad studying conditions
at home could impair the academic success of motivated students. The school we study is
located in a rural area southeast of Paris. It was the first “Internat d’excellence” to open,
and it is also the largest of the 45 “Internats d’Excellence” now operating in France, with
an intake accounting for 10% of that of the 45-school program. It serves students from all
eastern parisian suburbs, the most deprived ones.
2.1 Research design and statistical methods
Students offered a seat in the boarding school were randomly selected out of a pool of ap-
plicants. We study the boarding school’s first two cohorts, those admitted in September
2009 and September 2010. In 2009, 129 seats were offered to students in 8th to 10th grades.
In 2010, 150 seats were offered to students in 6th to 12th grades. The school received 275
applications in 2009, and 499 in 2010. In the spring of each year, a committee screened ap-
plications to make sure that the students met the school’s eligibility criteria. The policy was
intended to target motivated students living in homes that were considered unconducive to
scholastic progress. In 2009, 73 applications were discarded for lack of eligibility. In 2010,
216 were discarded. A few applicants (five in 2009 and seven in 2010) were granted priority
admission because they faced particularly tough conditions at home. The boarding school
had set a predetermined intake of students at the grade and gender levels, to ensure that
male- and female-only dormitories of given sizes could be formed. In each grade × gender
stratum in which the number of applicants still exceeded the number of seats remaining after
the screening and priority admission, we randomly allocated applicants a waiting list number.
Seats were offered following this order. Our study population is made up of the 395 students
who participated in a lottery. Our treatment group consists of the 258 students who received
an offer, and our control group consists of the 137 students who did not receive an offer.
The lottery created very similar treatment and control groups. In Table 13 in the Ap-
pendix, we compare them on 14 measures of baseline ability and socio-economic background.
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We find only one significant difference at the 10% level.
Compliance with random assignment was high. As shown in Table 1, one year after
randomization lottery losers had spent only 0.05 years in the boarding school. 6% of these
students managed to enrol, because one of their siblings had been admitted to the school,
but not all of them stayed for the entire year. On the contrary, by that time lottery winners
had spent 0.8 years in the school. 14% of them never joined, and 10% left during the year.
Two years after the lottery, winners had spent 1.27 more years in the school than losers. This
difference is lower than 2× the difference after one year because the exit rate between the two
years was higher among winners.
Table 1: Effect of the lottery on years spent in the school
Control mean T-C after 1 year SE T-C after 2 years SE N
Years of treatment 0.052 0.748*** 0.040 1.269*** 0.082 790
Notes. This table reports coefficients from a regression of the number of years spent in the school on a dummy
for year 1 (column 2), the interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column 3), a dummy for year 2, the
interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column 5), and the statistical controls listed in Section 2.2.
We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. We use two observations per student (one
and two years after the lottery). Standard errors reported in columns 4 and 6 are clustered at the student’s
level. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
In all the regressions we estimate in the paper, we use propensity score reweighting to
account for the fact our lottery offer is randomly assigned within grade × gender strata (see
Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983 and Fro¨lich, 2007). Let Zi be a dummy denoting our lottery offer,
and let Si denote lottery stratum. In our regressions, students in the treatment group receive
a weight equal to
√
P (Zi=1)
P (Zi=1|Si) , while control students receive a weight equal to
√
P (Zi=0)
P (Zi=0|Si) .
1
These weights ensure that our coefficients of interest arise from the comparison of lottery
winners and losers within and not across strata. Alternatively, we could have estimated
unweighted regressions with lottery strata indicators. These regressions estimate a variance-
weighted average of within-strata comparisons, which does not give to each stratum its natural
weight in the population. Therefore, these regressions do not estimate standard parameters
of interest in policy analysis such as intention to treat (ITT) or local average treatment effects
(LATE). Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that using one or the other estimation method
hardly changes our main results.
1Using a GMM representation, it is easy to see that this reweighting is computationally equivalent to
standard propensity score reweighting.
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2.2 Data
French students do not take standardized tests every year. Consequently, we had to conduct
a complex data collection operation to measure students’ academic ability and non-cognitive
outcomes. This, among other things, involved collaborating with 169 different schools scat-
tered over the whole of France as we detail below.
One and two years after the lottery, we gave students two standardized tests, each one hour
and 30 minutes in length. The first test included a one-hour French test and a 30-minute non-
cognitive questionnaire. The second test included a one-hour mathematics test and another
30-minute non-cognitive questionnaire. The French Department of Education created the
French and mathematics tests. We devised the non-cognitive questionnaires, using validated
psychometric scales and questions from the Program for International Student Assessment
(PISA).
Tests were taken online in the computer lab of students’ schools. Boarders took them
with their classmates. To ensure that treatment and control students were taking the test in
somewhat comparable conditions, we randomly selected three classmates to take the test with
every student not enrolled in the boarding school. We also took extensive steps to prevent
cheating: we sent research assistants to the boarding school to serve as test proctors; the
programming of the test ensured questions did not appear in the same order on neighboring
computers, so that neighboring students would not answer the same question at the same
time; students could only bring a pen and a sheet of paper to the test room. Students not
enrolled in the boarding school were scattered among 169 schools. Most of them were in
the local school district of Creteil, but some of them were in other areas of France. Due to
budget constraints, we could not send research assistants to monitor the tests in each of these
169 schools. Notwithstanding, the Department of Education wrote to the principals of all of
these schools to require that our test be monitored by someone from the school. Because the
tests were taken online, we can check whether students who took the test out of the boarding
school spent more time on the test than was allowed. We do not find evidence of this (see
Table 14 in the Appendix). A few schools did not have a working computer lab, and we had
to send them paper versions. A few students had dropped out of school by the time they were
supposed to take one of our tests. These students took the tests at home. Our main results
are robust to dropping these observations (see Table 15 in the Appendix).
In order to ensure that our results would not be plagued by differential attrition, extensive
effort was required to reach all of the control students, who were scattered among many more
schools than treatment students. In the end, more than 90% of students took our tests, and
attrition was balanced in the treatment and in the control groups as shown in Table 16 in the
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Appendix.
Cognitive tests were partly revised each year by the Department of Education to ensure
that students and their teachers could not anticipate which questions would be asked in the
following year. We tried not to change our non-cognitive questionnaires from one year to the
other, to ensure the comparability of students’ responses. However, at the end of the first year
of data collection, we realized that students took much less than the allotted 30 minutes to
answer our non-cognitive questionnaires. As a result, in the following years, we added more
questions. Unfortunately, this means that some questions are not available one year after the
lottery for the first cohort of students.
Finally, we also rely on a number of pre-existing sources of information to describe our
study population and the treatment. We use students’ average marks in mathematics and
French from transcripts required in the application process as measures of baseline ability.
We use the “Base Scolarite´” (Sconet) administrative data set to describe the students’ socio-
economic background. We also use data from the “Diploˆme National du Brevet”, the French
national exam given to students at the end of middle school, to compare applicants to the
boarding school to their classmates and to French students. Finally, we use the “Base Relais”,
an administrative data set on teachers and supervisors working in French schools, to compare
the school staff in the boarding school to the staffs in schools where control students were
enrolled.
To increase statistical precision, all of our regressions include the following list of controls:
students grades in French, math, and school behavior, as per the transcripts they provided
in their application; a dummy for students enrolled in a Greek or Latin optional class at
baseline; the level of financial aid students’ family receive under the means-tested grant for
middle- and high-school students; a dummy for whether French is the only language spoken
at home; a dummy for students whose parents are unemployed, blue collar workers, or clerks;
dummies for boys, second cohort, and school grade. Our main results are robust to dropping
these controls from the regressions (see Table 17 in the Appendix).
2.3 The population of applicants to the boarding school
We measure the effect of the boarding school within the population of students who applied
for seats. This population is the product of several layers of selection. In the fall of each year,
the Department of Education wrote to school principals asking them to identify motivated
students who lacked home environments conducive to studying, and to encourage these stu-
dents to apply. Students interested in joining the school then had to fill out an application
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form, write a letter of application, and provide a letter from a parent. Finally, a committee
discarded applications which did not match the profile targeted by the policy.
In Table 2, we describe our study population. Whenever data are available, we also
compare the student population to several reference populations. Our population comprises
a majority of girls (57 percent), and students’ average age when they applied was 14. Eligible
applicants are higher achievers than their classmates, but median students in the French
population. At the time of application, applicants’ average marks in French and mathematics
were, respectively, two and two and a half points above those of their classmates, and they
ranked slightly above the third decile of their class in each discipline. Slightly more than half
of our study population had taken the end-of-middle-school French exam before applying for
the boarding school. Those students scored 14 percent of a standard deviation higher than
the French average in French and mathematics, and 42 percent of a standard deviation higher
than their classmates. Under a normality assumption, this implies that eligible applicants
stand at the 45th percentile of the French distribution.
Eligible applicants are also underprivileged students. The share of eligible applicants
who are recipients of the means-tested grant for middle- and high-school students is twice as
large as in the French population, and close to the share observed among students enrolled
in “E´ducation prioritaire” schools, a program that encompasses French schools located in the
poorest neigborhoods. Still, given that the program explicitly targets disadvantaged students,
it might seem surprising that this fraction is not higher than 46 percent. This could be due
to the fact that a substantial fraction of eligible families do not claim this grant because its
amount is low and the application procedure costly. Applicants’ parents are as likely to be
clerks and blue-collar workers as parents of their classmates, and more likely to be inactive,
and the schools from which applicants come are located in one of the poorest areas in France.
French is the only language spoken at home for only 40 percent of them: this suggests that
many come from families that recently immigrated to France.
3 The treatment
In this section, we compare the amount of educational inputs received by boarders and control
students. Specifically, we estimate the following two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions
for 40 such inputs Yi:
Yi = η0 + η1Di +X
′
iζ + εi. (1)
Yi are either objective measures of the resources of the school where student i is enrolled
(e.g. class size), or measures of students’ i experience (e.g. perceived levels of classroom
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Table 2: Economic background and baseline academic ability of applicants
Applicants French “E´ducation Classmates
students prioritaire”
Baseline ability
Mark in French, transcripts 12.566 10.500
Rank in French, transcripts 0.271
Mark in Mathematics, transcripts 13.001 10.529
Rank in Mathematics, transcripts 0.298
Middle school exam, French 0.141 0.000 -0.288 -0.335
Middle school exam, Mathematics 0.145 0.000 -0.352 -0.241
Socio-economic background
Means tested grant, middle school 0.455 0.278 0.468
Means tested grant, high school 0.417 0.249
Parent clerk 0.249 0.210
Parent blue collar 0.261 0.278
Parent inactive 0.179 0.082
Parent has completed high school 0.238
Only French spoken at home 0.405
Other characteristics of applicants
Share of girls 0.572
Average age 14.125
Number of children in the family 2.832
Notes. This table compares applicants to the boarding school to a number of reference populations.
Socio-economic variables on applicants come from the “Sconet” administrative data set. Transcripts come from
their application files. Grades in the end-of-middle-school exam come from the “Base Brevet” administrative
data set. Data on French students, students enrolled in “E´ducation Prioritaire” schools and in the Cre´teil
school district come from DGESCO (2010). Ranks range from 0 (highest) to 1 (lowest).
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disruption). Di is a dummy for whether student i was enrolled in the boarding school at the
time the measure was made. We use the dummy for our lottery offer Zi as an instrument for
Di. Xi is the vector of statistical controls listed in Section 2.2 and εi is a residual. η1 measures
the difference in the amount of input Yi received by students who comply with their lottery
offer when they are in and out of the boarding school. Indeed, it is equal to the difference
between lottery winners’ and losers’ average of Yi, normalized by the difference in the share
of students enrolled in the boarding school between these two groups. Estimates of the mean
of Yi for compliers in the control group are displayed in the second column of Tables 3, 4, and
5 (we follow the method described in Abadie (2003) to estimate this quantity). Estimates of
η1 are displayed in the third column.
To measure students’ experiences, we included questions from PISA on levels of disruption
in the classroom, relationships between students, etc., in the questionnaires we administered
to students. Answers to these questions could take four values: “strongly disagree”, “disagree”,
“agree”, and “strongly agree”. In Tables 4 and 5, we present the effect of being enrolled in
the boarding school on students’ standardized answers to these questions. When several
questions arguably measure the same dimension, we aggregate them into a score which we
also standardize.2
The boarding school benefits from more resources than the schools in which control stu-
dents are enrolled. As shown in Table 3, the teacher-to-student ratio is 35 percent higher
in the boarding school, which corresponds to the fact that classes are 25 percent smaller.
The supervisor-to-student ratio is almost five times larger, because students must also be
monitored at night. Boarding school teachers are better educated and less experienced than
teachers of control students. A larger fraction of them hold the “Aggre´gation”, the highest
degree for high school teachers in France. But twice as many of them have less than three years
of experience. Based on these two observable dimensions, boarding school teachers appear
less likely to generate high test scores than those in control schools. There is indeed little
evidence in the literature that more educated teachers generate higher students test scores,
while there is some evidence that experienced teachers do. In particular, the first years of
experience seem to have higher returns – for a meta-analysis, see Hanushek & Rivkin (2006).
But teachers in the boarding school have volunteered to join, so they could differ from control
schools teachers on unobservable dimensions such as motivation.3
2All the tables in this section present results two years after the lottery took place, because some of these
questions were not included in the questionnaires administered to the first cohort one year after the lottery. In
Tables 19, 20, and 21 shown in the Appendix, we present results one and two years after the lottery, keeping
only the second cohort for questions which were not administered to the first cohort one year after the lottery.
We find few differences between the two years.
3In our policy report (see Behaghel et al., 2013), we conducted a cost-benefit analysis. Using results from
Piketty & Valdenaire (2006), we computed that the effects of the boarding school on students cognitive scores
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Table 3: Resources allocated to the boarding school
E(Y0|C) LATE SE N
Class size 26.060 -6.089*** 0.966 352
Teachers per 100 students 8.416 2.974*** 0.242 373
Supervisors per 100 students 1.592 6.088*** 0.129 375
Teachers with “Aggregation” degree 0.177 0.101*** 0.021 378
Teachers with less than 3 years experience 0.187 0.202*** 0.012 378
Teachers years of experience 9.891 -3.493*** 0.429 378
Notes. This table reports results from 2SLS regressions of the outcomes in the first column on a dummy
for being enrolled in the school and the statistical controls listed in Section 2.2, using our lottery offer as an
instrument. The third column reports the coefficient of the dummy (η1 in equation 1). Standard errors in
column 4 are clustered at the class level. The second column reports an estimate of the mean of the outcome
for compliers not enrolled in the school. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. The
last column displays the number of observations. We use only one observation per student, two years after the
lottery. The class size variable comes from students’ questionnaires. The other variables come from the “Base
Relais” administrative data set. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Boarders also benefit from a much better classroom experience than control students, as
shown in Table 4. As per our score, levels of classroom disruption are 70 percent of a standard
deviation lower in the boarding school. For instance, students are less likely to answer that
they cannot work well in the boarding school. Living together in the boarding school in-
creases solidarity and cooperation among students: treated students are more likely to report
that they do their homework in groups, and that strong students help weak ones. Boarding
school teachers are more engaged: boarders are more likely to report that their teachers keep
explaining until all students have understood, that they give them the opportunity to express
their opinions, and that they care about students’ academic progress. They also perceive
their teachers much more positively: overall, our students-teacher relationship score is one
standard deviation higher in the boarding school.
But boarders face higher academic demands. They have to take a two-hour test each
week, and grading in the boarding school is much harsher than in a regular school. Students
from the first cohort experienced a 2.1 point decrease in their marks in math after entering
the boarding school.4 This is a substantial drop, equivalent to 53 percent of the standard
are comparable to those one could expect to obtain by dividing class size by two within a comparable population
of French middle- and high-school students. We also found that the expenditure per student is twice as large
in the boarding school as in a regular school, mostly due to the boarding school component of the program
(monitoring students at night, heating...). We therefore concluded that the boarding school is as cost-effective
as class size reduction.
4Unfortunately, we do not have marks in the boarding school for the second cohort of students.
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Table 4: Students’ experience in the classroom
E(Y0|C) LATE SE N
Attendance over the last two weeks
Attendance score 0.215 0.166 0.204 361
Missed school -0.319 -0.065 0.214 362
Skipped classes -0.182 -0.156 0.204 361
Arrived late -0.068 -0.209 0.209 362
Disruption
Disruption score -0.145 -0.697*** 0.231 360
Teacher often waits students calm down -0.164 -0.401* 0.226 361
Students start working long after class begins -0.193 -0.336 0.222 361
Students cannot work well -0.104 -0.426** 0.209 360
There is noise and disruption in the classroom -0.128 -0.524** 0.217 361
Students do not listen to the teacher -0.044 -0.971*** 0.247 361
Relationships between students
Students relationships score 0.101 0.701*** 0.200 288
Students are ashamed when they have good grades -0.048 -0.218 0.213 289
Weak students make fun of strong ones -0.388 0.093 0.209 334
Students do their homework in group -0.123 0.532** 0.215 361
Strong students help weak ones -0.050 0.942*** 0.217 360
Teachers’ engagement
Teachers’ engagement score -0.139 1.350*** 0.256 361
She cares for students academic progression -0.064 0.748*** 0.202 361
She explains until students understand -0.148 1.205*** 0.215 361
She listens to students opinions -0.023 0.800*** 0.222 361
Teacher-students relationships
Teacher-students relationships score 0.032 1.000*** 0.248 346
Students get along well with their teachers 0.057 0.834*** 0.269 362
Teachers care for students 0.073 0.760*** 0.224 346
Teachers listen to students 0.031 0.722*** 0.230 362
Teachers give supplementary help if needed -0.026 0.869*** 0.233 362
Teachers are fair to students 0.007 0.715*** 0.237 362
Notes. This table reports results from 2SLS regressions of the outcomes in the first column on a dummy
for being enrolled in the school and the statistical controls listed in Section 2.2, using our lottery offer as an
instrument. The third column reports the coefficient of the dummy (η1 in equation 1). Standard errors in
column 4 are clustered at the class level. The second column reports an estimate of the mean of the outcome
for compliers not enrolled in the school. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. The
last column displays the number of observations. We use only one observation per student, two years after
the lottery. All the variables come from students’ questionnaires. Each score in italics is standardized and
computed from the individual items listed just below. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
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deviation of math grades in the boarding school. Because school marks in France are not
digitized, we could not collect them for control students. Teachers in regular schools might
have tougher marking standards for higher grades, in which case control students might also
have experienced a decline of their marks following the lottery. To investigate this possibility,
we conduct the following exercise. As students from the first cohort entered in 8th, 9th, or
10th grade, they thus went from 7th to 8th, 8th to 9th, or 9th to 10th grade. Transcripts in
France usually include both a student’s mark and the average mark in her class. The green
line on Figure 1 shows class averages in math at baseline for students who applied when they
were in 7th, 8th, 9th, or 10th grade. Under the assumption that these four groups of students
do not come from schools with very different marking standards, this green line should be a
good proxy of the “natural” year-on-year evolution of marks between these four grades. The
three blue lines on Figure 1 show the evolution of marks after entering the school for boarders
who joined in 8th, 9th and 10th grade, respectively. The green line is mostly flat: the only
noticeable pattern is that class averages decrease by 1.2 points between 7th and 8th grade.
On the contrary, the three blue lines all sharply decrease. Given that students who applied
in 7th grade only account for 20 percent of the first cohort, only 1.2 × 0.2/2.1 =11 percent
of the sharp decline in marks this cohort experienced can be attributed to the mechanical
evolution of school marks across grades. The remainder seems attributable to harsher grading
standards in the boarding school.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Students’ Mathematics Marks
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Boarders also have to cope with longer studying days and stricter disciplinary rules. Stu-
dents do not have more class hours in the boarding school than in a regular school, but at
the end of their school day they have to spend one hour and a half in a study room in which
they are monitored by a supervisor to do their homework. In control schools, spending some
time after the school day in a study room is only a non-mandatory option available to stu-
dents. This is why treated students report spending almost six hours per week in a study
room, against one hour and fifteen minutes for those in the control group, as shown in Table
5. Access to TV is strictly regulated in the boarding school, and playing video games is,
in theory at least, forbidden. Consequently, treated students report watching TV only 24
minutes per day, against 1 hour and 36 minutes for controls. They also report spending less
time playing video games, but the difference is not statistically significant. From the end of
the school day to the moment they go to bed, boarders are monitored by supervisors, who
have to enforce stringent disciplinary rules. For instance, students have to wear formal school
uniforms, a very unusual practice in French schools. This seems to generate conflicts between
them and students: our students-supervisor relationship score is 37 percent of a standard
deviation lower in the boarding school than in control schools.
Overall, the boarding school offers to underprivileged students an elite education rem-
iniscent of French “Classes Pre´paratoires” and English and American upper-class boarding
schools. Indeed, the important concentration of resources on a small number of students, the
interactions with qualified and engaged teachers, the high academic demands, the long school
days, and the strict disciplinary rules are common features of all these schools.
4 Effects of the boarding school on students cognitive out-
comes
4.1 Effects on the average of test scores
This section presents the impacts of the boarding school on test scores in French and math-
ematics, one year and two years after the lottery. We present first-stage, intention-to-treat
and two-stage least squares estimates in Table 6.
Panel A in Table 6 displays the first-stage estimates, i.e. estimates of the effect of winning
the lottery on the number of years spent in the boarding school. Specifically, we estimate the
following equation:
Sit = γ01{t = 1}+ γ1Zi × 1{t = 1}+ γ21{t = 2}+ γ3Zi × 1{t = 2}+X ′iζ + εit. (2)
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Table 5: Students’ experience outside the classroom
E(Y0|C) LATE SE N
Students’ schedule after the school day
Hours spent last week in study room 1.254 4.413*** 0.862 353
Hours spent last Monday playing video games 0.430 -0.245 0.202 348
Hours spent last Monday watching TV 1.598 -1.180*** 0.265 354
Supervisor-students relationships
Supervisor-students relationships score -0.058 -0.368* 0.219 289
Students get along well with their supervisors 0.016 -0.508** 0.218 319
Supervisors care for students -0.149 0.117 0.210 362
Supervisors listen to students -0.229 -0.032 0.215 332
Supervisors give supplementary help if needed -0.152 -0.275 0.227 361
Supervisors are fair to students 0.090 -0.648*** 0.216 306
Notes. This table reports results from 2SLS regressions of the outcomes in the first column on a dummy
for being enrolled in the school and the statistical controls listed in Section 2.2, using our lottery offer as an
instrument. The third column reports the coefficient of the dummy (η1 in equation 1). Standard errors in
column 4 are clustered at the class level. The second column reports an estimate of the mean of the outcome
for compliers not enrolled in the school. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. The
last column displays the number of observations. We use only one observation per student, two years after the
lottery. All the variables come from students’ questionnaires. The supervisor-students relationships score is
standardized; it is computed from the individual variables listed below. *significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Si1 and Si2 respectively denote the total number of years that student i has spent in the
boarding school by the end of the first and second academic years after randomization, re-
spectively; 1{t = 1} and 1{t = 2} are dummies for first and second year; Xi is the vector
of statistical controls listed in Section 2.2; Zi indicates whether student i won the lottery;
and εit is a residual. Equation 2 estimates the effect of the lottery after one and two years
separately, instead of pooling the two effects together: γ1 and γ3 are respectively equal to the
difference between lottery winners’ and losers’ average years of enrollment one and two years
after the lottery. Variables Si1 ∈ [0, 1] and Si2 ∈ [0, 2] do not only take integer values: some
students dropped out from the boarding school during the academic year, in which case we
compute fractions of years based on the number of days actually spent in the boarding school.
Estimates of γ0, γ1, and γ3 are displayed in the second, third, and fifth columns of panel A.
The seventh column reports the p-value of a test of γ1 = γ3.
At the end of the first year, lottery losers had spent 5.3 percent of a year in the boarding
school on average. This reflects the fact that about 6 percent of them entered the boarding
school during the first year, and most of them stayed for the year. At that point, lottery
winners had spent on average 0.773 more years at the boarding school than control students.
Two years after the randomization, they had spent 1.327 more years there.5
Panel B in Table 6 displays intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates, i.e. estimates of the effect
of winning the lottery on students’ French and mathematics test scores. Specifically, we
estimate the following equation:
Yit = α01{t = 1}+ α1Zi × 1{t = 1}+ α21{t = 2}+ α3Zi × 1{t = 2}+X ′iζ + ηit, (3)
where Yit is student i’s test score t years after randomization, and ηit is a residual. As the first
stage equation, this ITT equation estimates the effect of the lottery after one and two years
separately: α1 and α3 are equal to the difference between lottery winners’ and losers’ average
test scores, one and two years after the lottery respectively. Estimates of α0, α1, and α3 are
displayed in the second, third, and fifth columns of panel B. The seventh column reports the
p-value of a test of α1 = α3. Standard errors are clustered at the student level. Clustering
standard errors at the class level leaves the results almost unchanged, as shown in Table 18
in the Appendix.
Lottery winners start outperforming losers only two years after the lottery, and only on
their mathematics scores. After one year, estimates of the effect of winning the lottery on
5The small differences between the first stage estimates reported in Tables 1 and 6 stem from the fact that
in Table 1 we use the full sample, while in Table 6 we only use the sample of students who took at least one
cognitive test.
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French and mathematics scores are small and not statistically different from zero. After two
years, the point estimate in French is still rather small and not significant. On the contrary,
the point estimate in mathematics is large and significantly different from zero: by then,
lottery winners score 25.1 percent of a standard deviation higher than losers.6 As this panel
contains four different estimates of the effect of the boarding school on test scores, one might
worry that this significant effect might be a false positive. However, its Bonferroni adjusted
p-value is 0.09 (see Abdi, 2007), the Bonferroni adjustment being conservative here because
the four outcomes in the panel are highly correlated. The chances that this effect is actually
a false positive are low. Finally, the effects on mathematics scores after one and two years
significantly differ at the 2 percent level.
Panel C in Table 6 displays local average treatment effects estimates, i.e. estimates of
the average effect of spending one year in the boarding school among students who complied
with their lottery offer (see Angrist & Imbens, 1995). Specifically, we estimate the following
equation by two-stage least squares (2SLS):
Yit = β0 × 1{t = 1}+ β1Si1 × 1{t = 1}+ β21{t = 2}+ β3Si2 × 1{t = 2}+X ′itζ + µit, (4)
using Zi × 1{t = 1} and Zi × 1{t = 2} as excluded instruments for Si1 × 1{t = 1} and
Si2 × 1{t = 2}. As the first stage and ITT equations, this 2SLS equation estimates the effect
of the boarding school after one and two years separately: β1 and β3 are equal to the difference
between lottery winners’ and losers’ average test scores, one and two years after the lottery,
respectively, normalized by the difference in the number of years spent in the boarding school
between these two groups at each date. Estimates of the mean of test scores for compliers in
the control group one year after the lottery are displayed in the second column of the panel.
(We follow the method described in Abadie (2003) to estimate this quantity.) Estimates of β1,
and β3 are displayed in the third and fifth columns. The seventh column reports the p-value
of a test of β1 = β3.
Two years after the lottery, the magnitude of our 2SLS estimates is consistent with previ-
ous findings from the literature. At this date, our estimates indicate that the boarding school
increases compliers’ mathematics scores by 20 percent of a standard deviation per year spent
in the school. Furthermore, it has no effect on scores in French.
Research studying the effects of educational policies in middle and high school has often
found low or zero effects in language, and effects on mathematics scores similar to the one we
6The number of observations in mathematics and French are different, as these two tests were taken on
different days, as explained in Section 2. For instance, some students who took the French test missed the
math test because they were sick on the day when it took place.
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show here. For instance, in the charter school literature, Dobbie & Fryer (2011) find that the
Promise Academy School in Harlem increases students mathematics test scores by 23 percent
of a standard deviation per year spent in the school, but has no effect on their English scores.
In Boston, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) and Angrist et al. (2010) find larger effects than
those we report here, but they also find stronger effects in mathematics than in English (+35
percent versus +12 percent of a standard deviation per year spent in the school). There is
no consensus yet on why many middle and high school interventions have larger returns on
mathematics than on language test scores. Some cognitive psychologists have argued that
language ability might be set during childhood while numerical ability might continue to
evolve during adolescence (see e.g. Hopkins & Bracht, 1975) Also, language is learned and
manipulated at home, whereas mathematics is more exclusively a school topic - which may
make it more dependent on teaching quality. One of the few exceptions to this language
versus mathematics divide is Curto & Fryer (2014), who study the SEED Boarding School
in Washington, D.C., the closest school to the one we study here for which causal effects on
test scores are available. They find comparable effects to ours in mathematics, and larger
effects in English (+23 and +20 percent of a standard deviation per year spent in the school,
respectively). As a potential explanation for their result, the authors argue that boarding
schools might be more efficient than other interventions at raising language ability if students
speak no or little English in their home environment. We do not find evidence of this here:
even when we focus on students for whom French is not the only language spoken at home, we
still find insignificant effects of the boarding school on their French test scores, even though
we lack statistical power to make definitive conclusions.
Our most surprising findings are the absence of any effect on test scores one year after
the lottery and the evolution of the treatment effect between the first and second year. First,
given all the positive inputs the boarding school provides to students – smaller class size, less
classroom disruption, more engaged teachers, higher achieving peers, supervised homework
time –, one could have expected lottery winners to outperform lottery losers even one year
after the lottery. Second, the positive impact of the boarding school on mathematics test
scores emerges only two years after the lottery. The order of magnitude is large: overall, at
the end of the second year, students who were exposed to the intervention for two years would
have a test score in mathematics almost 40 percent (2× 0.191) of a standard deviation larger
than untreated students. Nevertheless, this arises entirely in the second year. This finding is
in sharp contrast with most papers in the literature studying dynamic effects of educational
interventions, which usually find effects linear or concave in the amount of exposure (see e.g.
Krueger, 1999 or Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2011).
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Table 6: Effect of the boarding school on test scores
Panel A: First stage estimates
Control mean FS after 1 year SE FS after 2 years SE FS 1 = 2 N
Years of treatment 0.053 0.773*** 0.040 1.327*** 0.084 0.000*** 744
Panel B: Intention to treat estimates
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
French 0.022 -0.060 0.109 -0.112 0.121 0.626 744
Mathematics 0.023 -0.014 0.094 0.251** 0.110 0.015** 735
Panel C: Two stage least squares estimates
E(Y0|C) 2SLS after 1 year SE 2SLS after 2 years SE 2SLS 1 = 2 N
French 0.014 -0.077 0.140 -0.085 0.091 0.948 744
Mathematics -0.026 -0.019 0.120 0.191** 0.082 0.064* 735
Notes. Panel A reports coefficients from a regression of the number of years spent in the school on a dummy
for year 1 (column 2), the interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column 3), a dummy for year 2, the
interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column 5), and the statistical controls listed in Section 2.2,
within the sample of students who took at least one cognitive test. Panel B reports coefficients from regressions
of French and math test scores on the same explanatory variables, within the sample of students who took
these tests. Panel C reports coefficients from 2SLS regressions of the French and math tests scores on a dummy
for year 1, the interaction of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after one year (column
3), a dummy for year 2, the interaction of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after two
years (column 5), and the statistical controls listed in Section 2.2, using our lottery offer interacted with the
year 1 and year 2 dummies as instruments, within the sample of students who took these tests. The second
column of this panel reports an estimate of the mean of French and math test scores for compliers not enrolled
in the school. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in
columns 4 and 6 are clustered at the student’s level. In column 7, we report the p-value of a test of equality of
the coefficients in the third and fifth columns. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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4.2 Dynamic selection or increasing returns?
The effect of the school on math scores is more than twice as large after two years than after
one year. There are two potential explanations for this pattern. First, students enrolled two
years might benefit more from their second than from their first year. Second, students leaving
between year one and two might benefit from lower effects than those who stay, leading to
an increase of the average effect of the school over time. In this section, we try to tell apart
these two potential explanations.
The effects we estimate arise from students who comply with our lottery offer. This
population can be divided into two groups: students induced by our offer to enroll in year
one but not in year two, and students induced to enroll in both years. Let us call movers (M)
and stayers (S) the first and second group, respectively. We can estimate pM (resp. pS), the
share of movers (resp. stayers) in the population, by regressing a dummy for being enrolled
in year one only (resp. in year one and two) on our lottery offer. We find pM = 20.7 percent
and pS = 58.5 percent. If no control group student had managed to enroll in the school,
movers (resp. stayers) would merely be lottery winners enrolled in year one only (resp. in
year one and two). In practice, as very few students from the control group managed to enroll,
this distinction does not matter much. Students enrolled only in year one account for 22.2
percent of the treatment group, implying that only (22.2-20.7)/22.2=6.7 percent of them are
actually not movers but always takers. Students enrolled both years account for 63.6 percent
of the treatment group, implying that only (63.6-58.5)/63.6=8.0 percent of them are actually
not stayers but always takers. In what follows, we omit this distinction, and we present our
analysis as if treatment group students enrolled one and two years were the same as movers
and stayers. This simplifies the exposition without affecting the substantive conclusions of
the discussion.7
Let δM1 and δ
S
1 denote the average effect produced by the boarding school on students’
mathematics score after one year, among movers and stayers respectively. Accordingly, let
δM2 and δ
S
2 denote the corresponding effects after two years. δ
S
2 is the cumulated effect of
having been enrolled two years in the boarding school among stayers, while δM2 is the effect of
7In Table 7, we compare the mean of some covariates between lottery winners enrolled one year only and
those enrolled both years. We could perform the same comparisons between movers and stayers. Let 1{M}
denote a dummy for being enrolled only one year and let X be some covariate. The coefficient of 1{M} in a
2SLS regression of X1{M} on 1{M} using the lottery offer as an instrument will estimate the mean of X among
movers. The intuition is the same as that described in Angrist & Pischke (2008) to recover the mean of X
among compliers in a standard instrumental variable setting with binary treatment. One can also estimate the
mean of X among stayers. In practice, estimating these 2SLS regressions instead of what is currently shown in
Table 7 hardly changes the results. Similarly, one can estimate average mathematics scores at baseline and one
and two years after the lottery among movers and stayers, and use them to conduct a difference-in-differences
analysis similar to that shown in Panel A of Table 8. Here as well, this hardly changes the results.
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having been enrolled one year ago among movers. δM1 , δ
S
1 , δ
M
2 , and δ
S
2 are the four structural
parameters generating our ITT estimates. Indeed, it is easy to show that α1 and α3 in
Equation (3) respectively satisfy
α1 = pMδ
M
1 + pSδ
S
1 (5)
α3 = pMδ
M
2 + pSδ
S
2 . (6)
This system of two equations with four unknowns is not identified. To be able to estimate,
say δM1 , we would need to compare movers’ scores to the scores of the control group students
who would also have been enrolled only in year one if they had won the lottery. As we do not
know who these students are, we cannot perform that comparison.
A whole range of parameter values are compatible with our estimates of α1 and α3 and
with Equations (5) and (6), some of which do not imply increasing returns to the school for
stayers. Figure 2 plots two interesting polar cases. In the left panel, δM1 is very negative,
δM2 = 0, and δ
S
2 = 2δ
S
1 . This corresponds to a scenario in which movers are hurt by their
first year in the school but fully recover once they leave, while stayers’ test scores are not
convex, but increase linearly with exposure. In this scenario, our ITT effect after one year
is a weighted average of a negative effect for movers and a positive effect for stayers; after
two years, it reflects the positive effect on stayers. In the right panel, δM1 = δ
M
2 = δ
S
1 = 0,
and δS2 > 0. This corresponds to a scenario where nobody benefits from their first year in
the school, while stayers start benefiting in their second year. In this second scenario, stayers
have larger returns to their first than to their second year (δS2 > 2δ
S
1 ).
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Figure 2: Two sets of parameter values compatible with our estimates.
In the first scenario, stayers and movers have highly heterogeneous returns to their first
year in the boarding school. This is not entirely implausible as these two groups of students
are quite heterogeneous in terms of baseline characteristics, as shown in Table 7. Movers have
significantly weaker baseline academic results and they are more often disruptive students.
Therefore, they might suffer from the strict discipline and high academic demands in the
boarding school, which could eventually generate a large negative effect for them.
In order to further examine the possible interpretations of the increase in the average
effect of the school over time, we conduct two suggestive tests which we report in Table 8.
In Panel A, we estimate two differences-in-differences (DID). We compare the evolution of
mathematics scores from baseline to year one and from year one to year two, between movers
and the control group; we then run the same comparison between stayers and the control
group. Specifically, we estimate the two following regressions, in the sample of movers and
lottery losers, and in the sample of stayers and lottery losers respectively:
Yit = λ0 + λ11{t ≥ 1}+ λ21{t = 2}+ λ31{M}+ λ41{M}1{t ≥ 1}+ λ51{M}1{t = 2}+X ′itζ + εit
Yit = γ0 + γ11{t ≥ 1}+ γ21{t = 2}+ γ31{S}+ γ41{S}1{t ≥ 1}+ γ51{S}1{t = 2}+X ′itζ + µit.
where 1{M} (resp. 1{S}) is a dummy for lottery winners enrolled in year one only (resp. in
both years). εit and µit are residuals. Estimates of λ3, λ4, and λ5 are reported in the second,
third, and fifth columns of the first line of the panel. Estimates of γ3, γ4, and γ5 are reported
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Table 7: Comparison of treatment group students by enrolment status
Movers Stayers P-value
Share in the population 0.222 0.636
Baseline ability and disruptiveness
Standardized mark in French, transcripts -0.480 0.082 0.000***
Rank in French, transcripts 0.428 0.247 0.004***
Standardized mark in Mathematics, transcripts -0.240 0.031 0.206
Rank in Mathematics, transcripts 0.347 0.259 0.126
Middle school exam, French -0.384 0.162 0.005***
Middle school exam, Mathematics -0.156 0.224 0.059*
Standardized school behavior grade, transcripts -1.251 0.228 0.001***
Socio-economic background
Means tested grant 0.397 0.481 0.272
Parent employee 0.231 0.252 0.761
Parent blue collar 0.293 0.280 0.856
Parent inactive 0.177 0.146 0.590
Parent has completed high school 0.301 0.225 0.276
Only French spoken at home 0.587 0.349 0.003***
Notes. This table compares lottery winners enrolled only in year one in the boarding school to those enrolled
both years. Socio-economic variables come from the “Sconet” administrative data set. Transcripts come from
application files. Grades for the end-of-middle-school exam come from the “Base Brevet” administrative data
set.
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in the second, third, and fifth columns of the second line. In the seventh column, we report
p-values of tests of λ4 = λ5 and γ4 = γ5. For these DIDs to capture the causal effect of the
boarding school among movers and stayers, a common trend assumption must be satisfied: in
the absence of the treatment, lottery losers, movers, and stayers would all have experienced
the same evolution of their scores from baseline to year one and from year one to year two.
The DID estimates resemble more the right than the left panel of Figure 2. From baseline
to year one, movers’ test scores increase slightly less than that of lottery losers, but this
difference is small and insignificant. From year one to year two, their scores increase slightly
more, but the difference is also small and insignificant. By contrast, the estimates for those
who stayed two years display a marked convex pattern: between baseline and year one, their
test scores do not follow a significantly different evolution from that in the control group;
between year one and two they increase by 30.6 percent of a standard deviation more. Under
the aforementioned common trends assumption, this implies that the increasing ITT effects
of the school mostly come from the fact that stayers benefit more from their second than from
their first year.
Panel B of Table 8 presents a second suggestive test. It builds upon the idea that if we
could isolate a subpopulation in which all compliers were stayers, the ITTs in this subpopu-
lation would only be driven by δS1 and δ
S
2 . Then, a convex pattern in these ITTs would imply
increasing returns for stayers in that subpopulation. As shown in Table 7, baseline character-
istics can be used to predict whether a student will be enrolled one year only in the boarding
school. Based on this observation, we estimate a probit model among lottery winners, with
a dummy for being enrolled only in year one as our dependent variable, and with a dummy
for whether French is the only language spoken at home, order two polynomials in baseline
French, mathematics, and school behavior grades, and interaction terms between the polyno-
mials and the dummy as explanatory variables.8 Then, we estimate the predicted probability
of being enrolled only one year for every student, and we divide each lottery stratum into two
groups, depending on whether a student’s predicted probability is above or below the median
in her stratum. Finally, we estimate the effect of the lottery on enrollment in the school and
mathematics scores as in Equation (3), separately in these two subgroups.
Our probit model predicts reasonably well who is going to leave: the exit rate during year
one is 17 percent (1 − 0.636/0.768) among students with a low probability to leave, against
33 percent (1− 0.572/0.853) among those with a high probability.9 Despite these differences
8We do not include middle-school exam grades because they are available for only half of the students.
9Note that students with a low probability to leave have a higher probability to enroll when they lose the
lottery than those with a high probability to leave (9.0 percent against 3.0 percent). This explains most of the
difference in the effect of the lottery on enrollment in year one between these two groups (+76.8 and +85.3
25
in enrollment patterns, ITT effects on mathematics scores do not substantially differ in the
two groups. In both groups, the point estimates are close to zero after one year, while they
are large and significant after two years.10 In the low probability group, pM and pS are
respectively equal to 13.2 and 63.6%, so ITTs closely reflect δS1 and δ
S
2 . The increase in the
effect of the school in this group is very likely to be driven by increasing returns to the school
among stayers.
Overall, the two suggestive tests presented in Table 8 point towards the same conclusion:
the increasing ITT effects of the school on students’ mathematics test scores seem to arise
from the fact that students staying two years benefit much more from their second than from
their first year, not from dynamic selection into the treatment.
4.3 Distributional and heterogeneous effects.
To conclude this section, we explore whether the average effects displayed in Table 6 hide
heterogeneity along the distribution of the outcome. We focus on effects after two years in
mathematics, as this is where average effects are statistically significant.11 Figure 3 displays
unconditional quantile treatment effects (QTE), following Firpo et al. (2009), and using the
lottery indicator Zi as the treatment variable. QTE estimates should therefore be compared
to ITT estimates in Table 6, panel B (+0.251 of a standard deviation).12
Our lottery offer has a positive effect on the upper part of the distribution of the outcome,
but has a negative effect on the lower part. Quantile treatment effects are: negative and
significant in the lower decile, around -0.3 standard deviation of the outcome; positive and
marginally significant in the middle of the distribution, around +0.3 standard deviation; large,
positive, and significant in the upper quintile, around +0.7 standard deviation. Overall, the
lottery offer produces a strong increase in the variance of the outcome.
percent, respectively).
10Both point estimates are slightly larger than that appearing in Table 6 for the entire population. When
we divide lottery strata into the high- and low-probability subgroups as described above, we end up with some
strata with no treatment or control group students. We therefore have to drop these strata from our estimation.
One can see that the number of observations used in the two regressions of Panel B of Table 8 does not sum
up to that in the regression of mathematics scores in Panel B of Table 6. Thus, this is the source of the slight
discrepancy.
11Results on French and after one year are in the Appendix. Most quantile treatment effects for these
outcomes are small and insignificant.
12As our treatment variable is not binary, we cannot use the instrumental variable quantile treatment effect
estimator proposed in Abadie et al. (2002) or Froelich & Melly (2013).
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Table 8: Increasing effects in mathematics: convexity or heterogeneity?
Panel A: Evolution of scores of movers/stayers compared to lottery losers
Diff 0 DID 1 - 0 SE DID 2 - 1 SE 1-0 = 2-1 N
Movers vs. lottery losers -0.269 -0.036 0.164 0.033 0.161 0.794 550
Stayers vs. lottery losers 0.136 -0.090 0.125 0.306** 0.121 0.054* 885
Panel B: ITT effects according to probability of leaving during or after first year
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
Low proba to leave
Enrolled 0.090 0.768*** 0.062 0.636*** 0.070 0.000*** 387
Mathematics score 0.409 -0.039 0.137 0.287* 0.170 0.067* 387
High proba to leave
Enrolled 0.030 0.853*** 0.052 0.572*** 0.065 0.000*** 331
Mathematics score -0.411 0.059 0.122 0.278** 0.125 0.102 331
Notes. The first line of panel A reports coefficients from a regression of students math test scores at baseline
and in year 1 and 2, on a constant, a dummy for year 1 and 2, a dummy for year 2, a dummy for lottery
winners enrolled in year one only (column 2), the interaction of this dummy and the dummy for year 1 and 2
(column 3), the interaction of this dummy and the dummy for year 2 (column 5), and the statistical controls
listed in Section 2.2, within the sample of lottery losers and winners enrolled only in year 1. The second
line reports coefficients from a regression of students math test scores at baseline and in year 1 and 2, on a
constant, a dummy for year 1 and 2, a dummy for year 2, a dummy for lottery winners enrolled in both years
(column 2), the interaction of this dummy and the dummy for year 1 and 2 (column 3), the interaction of this
dummy and the dummy for year 2 (column 5), and the statistical controls listed in Section 2.2, within the
sample of lottery losers and winners enrolled in both years. The upper part of panel B reports coefficients from
regressions of students enrolment status and math test scores on a dummy for year 1 (column 2), the interaction
of this dummy with our lottery offer (column 3), a dummy for year 2, the interaction of this dummy with our
lottery offer (column 5), and the statistical controls listed in Section 2.2, within the sample of students with
a low probability of leaving who took at least one cognitive test. The lower part of panel B reports the same
coefficients from the same regressions, within the sample of students with a high probability of leaving who
took at least one cognitive test. We use propensity score reweighting in both panels. Standard errors reported
in columns 4 and 6 are clustered at the student’s level. In column 7, we report the p-value of a test of equality
of the coefficients in the third and fifth columns. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Figure 3: QTE in Mathematics after 2 years, intention-to-treat.
Under the assumption that the boarding school does not change the rank of a student
in the distribution of mathematics scores, these findings imply that winning the lottery is
mostly beneficial to the strongest students. To test the validity of this interpretation, we
investigate heterogeneous treatment effects according to baseline ability in math. Given the
sharp difference between quantile treatment effects in the upper part and in the rest of the
distribution, we compare ITT estimates for students in the top tercile of baseline math scores
and for those in the middle and bottom terciles.13 Table 9 reproduces Table 6 for those two
subgroups. Panel B shows that the 0.251 ITT effect of Table 6 is actually the average of
a large, positive, and highly significant effect in the upper tercile (+0.605) and of a small
and non significant impact in the other two terciles. As the effect of the lottery on actual
enrollment is very similar in the two subgroups (Panel A), the 2SLS estimates are also very
different in these two populations (Panel C).
13When we disaggregate the middle and bottom terciles, we do not find any significant difference between
the ITT effects in these two terciles.
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To sum up, assignment to the boarding school has a large positive impact on math scores
after two years, whose magnitude is comparable to available estimates of charter school im-
pacts in the United States. However, two surprising results emerge: the positive value-added
of the boarding school only emerges after two years, and even at that time, it is mostly con-
centrated among students with higher initial ability. There is even evidence suggesting that
a non-negligible share of lottery winners are actually harmed by the offer to enter the school.
Table 9: Heterogeneous effects, according to baseline mathematics scores
Panel A: First stage estimates
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
In upper tercile at baseline 0.049 0.781*** 0.068 1.265*** 0.140 0.000*** 237
Out of upper tercile at baseline 0.057 0.785*** 0.054 1.338*** 0.134 0.000*** 472
P-value In = Out 0.968 0.706
Panel B: Intention to treat estimates
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
In upper tercile at baseline 0.763 -0.017 0.197 0.605*** 0.196 0.006*** 237
Out of upper tercile at baseline -0.331 0.019 0.095 0.090 0.119 0.545 472
P-value In = Out 0.869 0.025**
Panel C: Two stage least square estimates
E(Y0|C) 2SLS after 1 year SE 2SLS after 2 years SE 2SLS 1 = 2 N
In upper tercile at baseline 0.835 -0.048 0.252 0.493*** 0.150 0.027** 237
Out of upper tercile at baseline -0.410 0.026 0.125 0.070 0.092 0.715 472
P-value In = Out 0.790 0.016**
Notes. The first line of Panel A reports coefficients from the same regression as that in Panel A of Table 6,
within the sample of students who took at least one math test and who were in the first tercile of math scores
in their lottery stratum at baseline. The second line reports the same coefficients from the same regression,
within the sample of students who took at least one cognitive test and who were not in the first tercile of math
scores in their lottery stratum at baseline. In the third (reps. fifth) column of the third line of the panel, we
report p-values of a test of equality of the coefficients reported in the third (resp. fifth) column of the first
and second lines. Accordingly, Panel B and C reproduce results for math scores in Panel B and C of Table
6, separately for students in and out of the first tercile of math scores at baseline. We use propensity score
reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in columns 4 and 6 are clustered at the
student’s level. In column 7, we report the p-value of a test of equality of the coefficients in the third and fifth
columns. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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5 Ready for boarding?
Standard education production functions usually posit that a student’s test score is an in-
creasing function of the quality of the learning environment, of the ability of the student’s
peers, and of the student’s own effort. The students’ learning environment improves on a
number of dimensions in the boarding school. As shown in Section 3, classes are 25 percent
smaller, teachers are more engaged, and levels of classroom disruption are lower. Peer quality
is also higher. As shown in Table 2, applicants to the boarding school scored 40 percent of
a standard deviation higher than their classmates in the national middle-school exam before
applying to the boarding school. Under the assumption that the peer quality of control group
students did not change much after the lottery, this means that boarders benefit from sub-
stantially better peers than control group students. Students’ effort should also be higher. As
shown in Table 5, boarders must spend one hour and a half every evening in a study room to
do their homework, while control group students have no similar requirement.
Under this simple production function, results from the previous section are puzzling.
First, it is surprising that exposure to such an intensive treatment has no effect after one
year. Then, even if positive effects after two years are more in-line with expectations, it is not
clear why the second year of treatment has very different effects from the first one. Indeed,
the supplementary inputs the school is providing to students have not changed between the
two years. Tables 3, 4, and 5 described the treatment by comparing schooling conditions for
boarders and control students two years after the lottery. In Tables 19, 20, and 21 shown in
the Appendix, we reproduce similar tables, in which we also report the differences in schooling
conditions for boarders and control students one year after the lottery, and the result of a
test for whether the difference after one year significantly differs from that after two years.14
There is no evidence that the nature or the intensity of the treatment changed between the
two years. One year after the lottery, lottery winners already benefit from smaller classes
and better studying conditions, and they already praise the quality of their teachers. Of
the 35 tests we conduct to assess whether school conditions experienced by boarders and
control students changed between the first and second year, only three have have a p-value
lower than 0.10. If anything, studying conditions in the boarding school seem to have slightly
deteriorated. Class size slightly increased, relationships among students deteriorated as per
one of our four measures, and tensions between students and their supervisors increased as
per one of our six measures.
This suggests that this simple production function omits an important input. Our pre-
14Unfortunately, one year after the lottery not all measures are available for the first cohort of students, and,
as a result, the samples in the supplementary tables are sometimes smaller than in the baseline tables.
30
ferred candidate is students’ well-being. We now review the evidence supporting this inter-
pretation, before discussing other potential mechanisms.
When they arrive in the boarding school, students need to adjust to a number of negative
changes. They have to cope with the separation from their friends and families; they relinquish
a certain amount of freedom; and they face higher academic demands. This probably explains
why one year after the lottery, levels of school well-being were significantly lower among
boarders, as shown in Table 10.15 At that date, as per our standardized score, lottery winners’
well-being is reduced by 32 percent of a standard deviation. When we look separately at the
eight items included in our score, we find two significant differences: boarders felt more
uncomfortable in school, and they were more likely to think that other students did not like
them. These two effects are unlikely to be false positives. Using a Bonferroni adjustment
to account for the fact we have eight measures of well-being, we obtain p-values respectively
equal to 0.04 and 0.08. Also, although they are not significant, all the other effects point to
a reduction in well-being.
In the end of their second year, students seem to have adjusted to their new environment.
At this point, the well-being score is slightly higher for boarders than for control students,
and we can reject at the 5 percent level that the effect of the boarding school is the same in
year one and year two. We also reject this test at the 10 percent level for two items of this
score out of eight. For seven items out of eight, the point estimates indicate that students’
well-being increased between the two years. We also measure the effect of the boarding school
on students’ academic, social, and general self-esteem, using the French translation of the
Self-Perception Profile for Adolescents (see Bouffard et al., 2002). The effect of the boarding
school on students academic self-esteem is insignificant both after one year and after two
years, but it significantly increases over time (p-value =0.065).
At the same time that levels of well-being catch-up, students’ motivation increases, and
they start spending more time on their homework. To measure students’ motivation for
schooling, we use the “motivation for education” scale (see Vallerand et al., 1989). Whereas
one year after the lottery there were no noticeable differences between boarders and control
students on any of its three sub-scales (extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, and amotivation),
after two years boarders have more intrinsic motivation for schooling as shown in Table 11.
Moreover, the effect of the school on students’ amotivation significantly decreases between
year one and two.
Similarly, although after one year, boarders did not report spending more time per week
15As school well-being questions were not included in the questionnaires administered to the first cohort one
year after the lottery, we only report results for the second cohort.
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Table 10: Effects of the school on well-being and self-esteem
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
School well-being
School well-being score 0.176 -0.322* 0.166 0.085 0.173 0.032** 364
In school, I feel like a stranger -0.095 0.123 0.164 -0.025 0.184 0.482 398
I have few friends 0.077 -0.092 0.178 0.002 0.184 0.666 398
I feel home 0.148 -0.228 0.173 0.256* 0.150 0.028** 398
I feel uncomfortable -0.116 0.514*** 0.182 0.243 0.193 0.243 397
Other students like me 0.157 -0.468** 0.182 -0.054 0.175 0.098* 365
I feel lonely -0.071 0.000 0.156 0.024 0.162 0.910 398
I do not want to go -0.097 0.046 0.180 -0.017 0.168 0.754 398
I am often bored -0.109 0.263 0.178 -0.065 0.166 0.136 398
Self-Esteem
Academic Self-Esteem 0.077 -0.141 0.109 0.079 0.125 0.065* 735
Social Self-Esteem 0.052 -0.026 0.136 0.034 0.130 0.579 734
General Self-Esteem 0.081 0.010 0.117 0.087 0.146 0.538 734
Notes. This table reports coefficients from regressions of the outcomes listed in the first column on a dummy
for year 1 (column 2), the interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column 3), a dummy for year 2,
the interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column 5), and the statistical controls listed in Section
2.2, within the sample of students for whom these outcomes are available at least one year. For well-being,
our estimation sample is the second cohort of students, as well-being measures are not available one year after
the lottery for the first cohort. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard
errors reported in columns 4 and 6 are clustered at the student’s level. In column 7, we report the p-value
of a test of equality of the coefficients in the third and fifth columns. All the variables come from students’
questionnaires. The school well-being score is standardized; it is computed from the individual variables listed
below. Self-esteem scores are also standardized and are based on Bouffard et al. (2002). *significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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on their homework, after two years lottery winners spend 25 percent more time on it than
lottery losers. During school days, boarders spend more time on their homework and less time
watching TV or playing video games. This effect is somewhat mechanical, merely reflecting the
rules in the boarding school: differences are large and quite constant over time. The increase
in total homework time during the second year seems to be driven by week-end behavior.
Although we lack statistical power to make definitive conclusions, it seems that during the
first year, treated students tend to compensate weekday effort by relaxing more during the
week-end. After two years, this pattern has changed markedly: boarders now spend more
time on their homework and less time watching TV or playing video games during the week-
ends. This is consistent with the increase in their intrinsic motivation we observe between the
first and the second year. None of these three evolutions between year one and two – time
spent on homework, television and video games on Saturdays – are statistically significant,
but the estimates all go in the same direction. To gain power, we compute the difference
between homework and “screen-time”, so as to concentrate this consistent information into
one coefficient. Both the substitution between homework and screen time on Saturdays during
the first year and the reversal after the second year are now significant.
Finally, we find some indication that the initial negative shock on well-being and motiva-
tion is more pronounced among weaker students, and that the recovery is faster for stronger
students, although we lack statistical power to make definitive conclusions. This could explain
why even after two years, only high-performing students seem to benefit from the school. In
Table 12, we report ITT effects of the school on the outcomes of Tables 10 and 11 for which
we found different effects after one and two years, distinguishing students in the upper tercile
of math scores at baseline from those in the middle and bottom terciles. After one year,
weaker students have more negative effects on each of these five outcomes, even though none
of the differences is statistically significant. Between year one and year two, effects increase
more for stronger than for weaker students on four outcomes out of five, even though once
again these differences are not significant.
To sum up, we find that the school has a negative effect on students’ well-being after
one year, which reverses in the second year. This could explain why its positive effect on
cognitive outcomes and on a number of measures of motivation and effort only appear in the
second year, although from their first year onwards boarders experience a number of positive
inputs. Results from other studies also point towards a positive link between well-being and
learning. Ly et al. (2013) study the transition from middle school to high school in France,
where students change schools and, as a result, part from most of their previous classmates.
They find that being assigned to a high school class with more of one’s previous classmates
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Table 11: Effects of the school on students motivation and effort
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
Motivation for schooling
Extrinsic motivation -0.026 -0.124 0.134 -0.030 0.126 0.556 732
Intrinsic motivation -0.010 0.034 0.124 0.330*** 0.119 0.023** 732
Amotivation 0.011 0.179 0.181 -0.173 0.151 0.076* 732
Hours spent last week...
Doing homework 6.090 0.042 0.491 1.581*** 0.514 0.013** 720
Hours spent last Monday...
Doing homework 1.302 0.357*** 0.130 0.458*** 0.127 0.477 722
Playing video games 0.500 -0.274** 0.131 -0.141 0.116 0.321 714
Watching TV 1.378 -0.835*** 0.145 -0.670*** 0.168 0.361 722
Homework -(video games+TV) -0.579 1.465*** 0.257 1.233*** 0.287 0.434 703
Hours spent last Saturday...
Doing homework 1.672 -0.138 0.199 0.266 0.196 0.118 721
Playing video games 1.175 0.333 0.236 -0.039 0.294 0.168 715
Watching TV 2.671 0.280 0.296 -0.144 0.281 0.225 720
Homework -(video games+TV) -2.147 -0.736* 0.391 0.493 0.452 0.013** 696
Notes. This table reports coefficients from regressions of the outcomes listed in the first column on a dummy
for year 1 (column 2), the interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column 3), a dummy for year 2,
the interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column 5), and the statistical controls listed in Section
2.2, within the sample of students for whom these outcomes are available at least one year. We use propensity
score reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in columns 4 and 6 are clustered at
the student’s level. In column 7, we report the p-value of a test of equality of the coefficients in the third
and fifth columns. All the variables come from students’ questionnaires. Motivation scores are standardized;
they are computed from the “motivation for education” scale (see Vallerand et al. (1989)). *significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 12: Effects on non-cognitive outcomes, according to baseline scores
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
School well-being
In upper tercile at baseline 0.130 -0.235 0.360 0.307 0.297 0.126 121
Out of upper tercile at baseline 0.164 -0.256 0.187 -0.040 0.214 0.297 234
P-value In = Out 0.958 0.342
Academic self-esteem
In upper tercile at baseline 0.488 -0.004 0.169 0.354 0.216 0.122 239
Out of upper tercile at baseline -0.115 -0.169 0.131 0.047 0.148 0.112 470
P-value In = Out 0.440 0.241
Intrinsic motivation
In upper tercile at baseline 0.045 0.201 0.223 0.549** 0.226 0.058* 236
Out of upper tercile at baseline -0.063 0.060 0.173 0.315** 0.145 0.174 470
P-value In = Out 0.617 0.384
Amotivation
In upper tercile at baseline -0.282 0.067 0.259 -0.311 0.236 0.160 236
Out of upper tercile at baseline 0.166 0.182 0.237 -0.182 0.192 0.179 470
P-value In = Out 0.744 0.672
Hours spent on homework
In upper tercile at baseline 5.664 1.259 0.977 2.495*** 0.821 0.196 236
Out of upper tercile at baseline 6.024 -0.375 0.535 1.280** 0.612 0.039** 458
P-value In = Out 0.143 0.236
Notes. The first line of the table reports coefficients from the same regression as that in the first line of Table 10,
within the sample of students who took at least one math test and who were in the first tercile of math scores
in their lottery stratum at baseline. The second line reports the same coefficients from the same regression,
within the sample of students who took at least one cognitive test and who were not in the first tercile of math
scores in their lottery stratum at baseline. In the third (reps. fifth) column of the third line of the panel,
we report p-values of a test of equality of the coefficients reported in the third (resp. fifth) column of the
first and second lines. Accordingly, the remaining lines of the table reproduce results for academic self-esteem,
intrinsic motivation, amotivation, and weekly hours spent on homework shown in Tables 10 and 11, separately
for students in and out of the first tercile of math scores at baseline. We use propensity score reweighting to
control for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in columns 4 and 6 are clustered at the student’s level. In
column 7, we report the p-value of a test of equality of the coefficients in the third and fifth columns. All the
variables come from students’ questionnaires. All measures except hours spent on homework are standardized.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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from middle school significantly reduces subsequent grade repetition and drop-out rates. The
effect is mostly driven by low socioeconomic-status students who move to high schools with
more high socioeconomic-status students than had been present in their middle schools. This
is evidence that maintaining earlier social ties, which presumably has a positive effect on
well-being, also has positive effects on learning. The interactions between well-being and
learning have also long been documented by educational and cognitive psychologists (see e.g.
Boekaerts, 1993 or Williams et al., 1988).
The boarding school induces strong non-cognitive adjustments; interactions between non-
cognitive and cognitive dimensions can account both for the time pattern we observe in this
experiment, and for the larger effects we observe among initially stronger students.
But students’ well-being is not the only missing input in the simple production function
introduced above that could account for our findings. A first alternative candidate could be
distance to teachers’ target level of instruction, as in Duflo et al. (2011). If teachers in the
boarding school tend to target their highest achieving students, this could explain why weaker
students do not improve, even after two years. This interpretation is not entirely consistent
with our data, however. First, we checked whether the increase in student’s opinion about
their teachers reported in Table 4 is larger for strong students than for weak students. Indeed,
if boarding school teachers target strong students, the increase in students’ satisfaction should
be larger for them. Appendix Table 22 shows that, if anything, the increase in students’
satisfaction is larger for weak students. Second, this mechanism cannot explain why strong
students do not benefit from their first year in the boarding school.
A second alternative candidate could be students’ rank in the classroom distribution.
Recent research has indeed shown that higher within-class ordinal position has a positive
effect on academic performance (see e.g. Murphy & Weinhardt (2013)). This can explain
why weaker students do not improve in the boarding school, as they lose many ranks when
they join. However, this still fails to explain why strong students do not improve during
their first year: these students do not lose many ranks when they join, and accordingly their
academic self-esteem does not seem affected at all in the end of their first year (cf. Table 12).
6 Conclusion
The boarding school we study produces surprising effects. It increases students’ math test
scores only two years after admission, even though we cannot find any evidence that the
supplementary educational inputs provided by the school changed between the two years. We
argue that an education production function in which students’ well-being interacts with their
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studying conditions can account for this pattern. Indeed, we find that levels of well-being were
lower among boarders one year after admission, probably due to the separation from their
friends and families and to the strict discipline and high academic demands in the boarding
school. By contrast, two years after admission boarders seemed to have adjusted to their new
environment: levels of well-being had caught up with that in the control group, and they also
started showing higher levels of motivation. We also find that effects after two years mostly
come from the strongest students at baseline. The boarding school does not seem well-suited
to weaker students: even after two years they do not experience any strong increase in their
test scores. In future work, we will investigate the effects of this boarding school on students’
higher education and labor market outcomes.
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Table 13: Balancing checks
Control Mean T-C SE N
Ability and disruptiveness
Grade in French 12.209 -0.125 0.343 392
Grade in Maths 12.437 0.189 0.393 392
Studies latin or greek 0.286 -0.097* 0.059 375
Studies german 0.266 -0.051 0.056 375
School behavior grade 15.304 0.390 0.508 343
Times missed school last term 5.596 0.600 0.687 350
Socio-economic background
Parent blue collar or employee 0.448 -0.035 0.061 393
Recipient of means tested grant 0.404 0.013 0.062 393
Number of children in the family 2.827 -0.100 0.196 393
Parents divorced 0.264 -0.020 0.063 351
Single-parent family 0.376 -0.075 0.064 353
Parent has no degree 0.106 -0.015 0.052 347
Parent completed high school 0.217 0.011 0.058 347
Only French spoken at home 0.366 0.064 0.062 353
Notes. This table reports results from regressions of the outcomes in the first column on a constant and a
dummy for our lottery offer. The second column reports the coefficient of the constant, while the third reports
the coefficient of the dummy. Standard errors in column 4 are robust. We use propensity score reweighting to
control for lottery strata. Measures of baseline ability and disruptiveness come from application files. Socio-
economic variables come from the “Sconet” administrative data set. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
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Table 14: ITT effects on the share of students spending more time than
allowed on the tests.
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
French 0.108 0.007 0.037 -0.012 0.046 0.722 722
Maths 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.016 0.731 712
Notes. This table reports coefficients from regressions of dummies for whether a student spent more time than
allowed on the French and Maths test on a dummy for year 1 (column 2), the interaction of this dummy with
our lottery offer (column 3), a dummy for year 2, the interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column
5), and the statistical controls listed in Section 2.2, within the sample of students for whom these outcomes
are available at least one year. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard
errors reported in columns 4 and 6 are clustered at the student’s level. In column 7, we report the p-value of
a test of equality of the coefficients in the third and fifth columns. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Table 15: ITT effects on test scores, excluding tests taken at home
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
French -0.001 -0.050 0.109 -0.104 0.122 0.643 712
Mathematics 0.029 -0.018 0.094 0.333** 0.138 0.010*** 704
Notes. This table reports coefficients from the same regressions as those presented in Panel B of Table 6,
excluding tests which were taken at home by the student. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
Table 16: Response rates to surveys
Control Mean T-C SE N
One year after the lottery
Took the French test 0.928 -0.024 0.019 395
Took the maths test 0.922 -0.029 0.020 395
Two years after the lottery
Took the French test 0.904 -0.021 0.022 395
Took the maths test 0.887 -0.013 0.029 395
Notes. This table reports results from regressions of the outcomes in the first column on a constant and a
dummy for our lottery offer. The second column reports the coefficient of the constant, while the third reports
the coefficient of the dummy. Standard errors in column 4 are robust. We use propensity score reweighting to
control for lottery strata. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 17: ITT effects on test scores, without controls
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
French 0.022 -0.076 0.120 -0.118 0.143 0.699 744
Mathematics 0.023 0.016 0.132 0.277** 0.134 0.021** 735
Notes. This table reports coefficients from the same regressions as those presented in Panel B of Table 6,
without statistical controls. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Table 18: ITT effects on test scores, clustering standard errors at the class
level
Control mean ITT after 1 year SE ITT after 2 years SE ITT 1 = 2 N
French 0.022 -0.060 0.117 -0.112 0.137 0.761 744
Mathematics 0.023 -0.014 0.098 0.251** 0.101 0.058* 735
Notes. This table reports coefficients from the same regressions as those presented in Panel B of Table 6,
clustering standard errors at the class level. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Table 19: Ressources allocated to the school, after 1 and 2 years
E(Y0|C) LATE year 1 SE LATE year 2 SE LATE 1 = 2 N
Class size 24.987 -7.476*** 0.864 -5.953*** 1.059 0.035** 396
Notes. This table reports coefficients from a 2SLS regression of class size on a dummy for year 1, the interaction
of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after one year (column 3), a dummy for year 2, the
interaction of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after two years (column 5), and the
statistical controls listed in Section 2.2, using our lottery offer interacted with the year 1 and year 2 dummies
as instruments. Our estimation sample is the second cohort of students, as class size is not available one year
after the lottery for the first cohort. The second column of this panel reports an estimate of the mean of French
and maths test scores for compliers not enrolled in the school. We use propensity score reweighting to control
for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in columns 4 and 6 are clustered at the class level. In column 7,
we report the p-value of a test of equality of the coefficients in the third and fifth columns. Measures of class
size come from students’ questionnaires. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 22: Students’ opinion on teachers: heterogeneous effects according to
maths baseline score.
E(Y0|C) LATE SE N
Teachers engagement score
In upper tercile at baseline -0.163 0.854*** 0.317 129
Out of upper tercile at baseline -0.209 1.314*** 0.275 232
Teachers-students relationships score
In upper tercile at baseline -0.012 0.666** 0.284 123
Out of upper tercile at baseline 0.018 0.914*** 0.221 223
Notes. The first line of the table reports coefficients from the same regression as that in Table 4 for teachers’
engagement score, within the sample of students who took at least one maths test and who where in the first
tercile of maths scores in their lottery stratum at baseline. The second line reports the same coefficients from
the same regression, within the sample of students who took at least one cognitive test and who where not
in the first tercile of maths scores in their lottery stratum at baseline. Accordingly, the following lines of the
table reproduce results for teachers-students relationships score shown in Table 4, separately for students in
and out of the first tercile of maths scores at baseline. We use propensity score reweighting to control for
lottery strata. Standard errors reported in column 3 are clustered at the class level. All variables come from
students’ questionnaires. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Figure 4: QTE in French after 1 year, intention-to-treat.
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Figure 5: QTE in Mathematics after 1 year, intention-to-treat.
Figure 6: QTE in French after 2 years, intention-to-treat.
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